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BEYOND CONTRACTS AND ORGANIZATIONS 
 
By MACIEJ KONRAD BOROWICZ* 
 
 
Professor Gunther Teubner’s (Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main) book 
Netzwerk als Vertragsverbund (2004) is now considered in Germany to be a 
classic. It was therefore only appropriate to make it available to a wider 
audience. Hart just published it in English, bringing us yet another in a series 
of brilliant books in the theory of private law – Teubner’s Networks as Connected 
Contracts (translated by Michelle Everson), with an excellent introduction by 
Hugh Collins.  
 
Books that appear in Hart’s International Studies in the Theory of Private Law 
series aim at exploring the potential of self- and co-regulatory strategies that 
promote the use of private law techniques of ordering in social and economic 
interactions. Networks – as Teubner argues in his book – can be devised as one 
such strategy. The books begins with the discussion of two German cases that – 
in his view – demonstrate the need to recognize a novel institution of private 
law, one that goes beyond the familiar notions of contracts and organizations 
(Chapter 1). Networks, the socio-economic argument unveils in Chapter 2, 
unlike contracts or organizations display certain features that uniquely 
predispose them to accommodate important regulatory functions. But if that 
function is to be socially beneficial, rather than one benefiting private actors 
themselves, law has to step in (Chapter 3). The three last chapters of the book 
discuss three hypothetical ways in which law can help achieve that result. 
 
Professor’s Teubner argument is persuasive, even if somewhat convoluted. It 
might strike the reader as convoluted because of the method he is using in his 
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endeavor – systems theory. When a book about networks begins with the 
assertion that our legal language may be not be complex enough to account for 
some of their properties and it also so happens that the book attempts to 
circumvent those alleged limitation of our legal language by embracing a 
paradox (in a “something simultaneously is and is not” fashion), it likely 
promise a tough and uncompromising read. And yet even if one is skeptical of 
the method (the second part of the review discusses why one may want to be), 
Networks as Connected Contracts still provides us with some truly illuminating 
insights into what are the different ways of thinking about them. 
Networks, business networks 
 
Networks have been studied in social sciences for many years now. The notion 
is a based on a straightforward recognition that relationships among things 
(people, organizations) have a number of different dimensions and are 
complicated. The notion of networks has been devised as a conceptual 
framework within which the patterns can be described and measured in a 
meaningful manner. A network describes a collection of nodes and the links 
between them. This notion has useful explanatory application in personal and 
professional contexts. Workers find jobs through personal acquaintances, 
academics develop their work through conversations with colleagues etc. But 
the notion of networks has also obvious applications in the business context. 
Business opportunities and choices, just like those personal and professional, 
are shaped by business connections and relationships. And it is business 
networks (in a broad sense, including virtual enterprises, just-in-time systems 
and franchise chains) that Teubner is interested in.  
 
A business network, as such, is thus hardly a legal concept. This is where 
professor Teubner’s inquiry begins. How can the legal system account for and 
accommodate the network-like properties of arrangements such those -  
“normally concluded in the form of bilateral contracts, but at the same time 
give rise to multilateral (legal effects)”?1 As he himself notes “[s]uch networks 
are extraordinarily confusing phenomena of private co-ordination, since they fit 
neither within the market category nor within the concept of organization.”2 
They “cut across the conceptual framework of private law doctrine. In legal 
terms, networks can take the form either of partnerships, corporate groups, 
relational contracts or of special tort/contractual relationships. For this reasons 
                                            
1 Gunther Teubner, Networks as Connected Contracts (Hart Publishing, 2011) (edited with an 
Introduction by Hugh Collins. Translated by Michelle Everson), 73.  
2 Ibid.  
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alone, the autonomy of legal doctrine precludes the immediate adoption of the 
social science concept of ‘network’ as a legal category.”3 And so the struggle 
begins.  
 
The struggle that Teubner’s book is concerned with is a struggle within 
German legal academia, one that has been ongoing for quite some time. But 
despite its doctrinal outlook, the argument’s relevance could not have been 
greater and timelier for a non-German audience. In the last two or three 
decades we have indeed witnessed a ‘network revolution’, which – as Teubner 
points out – has dramatically altered the strategic position of networks within 
the economy and that is now forcing law to recognize them in their own right. 
Empirical studies from many industrial sectors – to which Teubner also refers - 
have provided comprehensive proof of the exponential expansion in business 
networking.4 Volatile market conditions and an ever-increasing market pressure 
for greater efficiency necessitates the search for novel and more flexible modes 
of commercial interactions between economic actors. “As a direct consequence, 
business have been forced to restructure themselves as network-type 
arrangements, within which trust-based co-operation forms the basis for 
enduring informational relations, recursive reinterpretation of events, and for 
the collective construction of knowledge.”5 From that point of view they can 
beneficial, because they generate efficiency. But Teubner is of course not a law 
and economics scholar. This is why he insists that when trying to conceptualize 
networks in law “at no time should the efficiency principle used by economists 
to characterize networks as a market/hierarchy hybrid be permitted to serve as a 
legal norm for networks.”6 Rather “social science analyses should explore the 
logic of action within network, should reveal the opportunities and risks posed 
by operations of networks and should reveal perspective of alternative solutions 
beyond our traditional categories of market and hierarchy.”7 
Embracing paradoxes: systems theory 
 
Professor Teubner is a prolific man, but he is not a man of easy answers. In 
chapters two and three of the book he outrightly rejects the legal 
characterization of networks as either organzations or typical exchange 
                                            
3 Ibid.  
4 Ibid., 94 
5 Ibid., 96 
6 Ibid., 75 
7 Ibid. 
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contracts. He tells us that we have to accept the contractual construction of 
networks, but also the corporate elements thereof. Moreover, we have to accept 
the two as contradictions and embrace the contradiction as something 
meaningful, productive and, in fact, a necessity. Law – he says – itself has not 
answer to this, because it can only respond to networks’ contradictions by 
reference to the parties’ will. There is however a different response which can 
be distilled out of sociological and economic analyses of networking paradoxes. 
 
Networks can be, in his view, understood as paradoxes because “[h]ybrid 
networks result from the fragile co-existence of different and contradictory 
logics of action . . . [t]his gives rise to ‘paradoxical structure’ of 
interorgniaztional interpretation, since it is founded on ‘contradictory 
demands’ that are simultaneously functional”.8 
 
In of the most problematic passages of his book he provides for a prescriptive 
solution of how can the legal system respond to that ‘paradoxical’ situation: 
“[i]n contrast to the treasured legal ability to furnish turbulent life with 
sufficient clarity, reliability and precision, legal doctrine in this context needs to 
produce ambiguous concepts that not only encompass contradiction, but that 
even cultivate and intensify them.”9 
 
Several legal concepts have been proposed in Germany earlier that were 
supposed to account for network-like properties of certain business 
arrangements. Teubner outrightly rejects all of them. He rejects Jhering and 
Gierke’s notion of networks as communities, Amschutz’s concept of ‘mixed 
contracts’, the idea of networks as corporate groups or Rohe’s notion of 
network contracts. He introduces the reader into these theories but rejects 
them as, for one reason, deficient and/or insufficient (perhaps, one is tempted 
to add, he does not find them sufficiently ambiguous). Also the notion of 
relational contracts, which will be familiar to English reader from the writings 
of Ian Macneil, “furnishes us with a relatively narrow box of normative tools 
with which to tackle the particularly interesting issue of multilateralism in 
networks.”10 Instead Teubner undertakes to make use of a notion of ‘connected 
contracts’, which has been introduced into the German Civil Code (BGB §358), 
after a long and heated discussion, in the context of credit agreements. But as a 
concept doctrinally tailored to these sorts of agreements it is not well suited to 
                                            
8 Ibid.,123. 
9 Ibid.,127.  
10 Relational contracts however, in Teubner’s view provide us with a more promising starting 
point, at least to the extent that they can be “infused with a network logic”. Ibid., 145.  
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serve as a more general doctrinal vehicle suitable for networks. Therefore 
Teuber attempts to generalize it. 
 
In his conceptualization a genuine connected contract emerges when, in 
addition to the usual characteristic that create a bilateral contract,  
- mutual references within the bilateral contracts to one another; 
- a substantive relationship with the connected contract’s common project 
and; 
- a legally effective and close co-operative relationship between associated 
members are present.11  
As such connected contracts are not just a subset of the normal range of legally 
effective relations – contracts and organizations. They are sui generis category.12 
What makes them so special? Back to systems theory: “The specificity of 
network lies in the fact that a contract observes its environment in a particular 
manner. Under normal conditions, contracts observe prevailing market 
conditions, in particular pricing, and adapt their internal structures 
accordingly.”13 Rather - Teubner draws on Luhman here – “the contractual 
systems observe another contractual system rather than the market, adapting its 
internal norms accordingly . . . all preconditions thus establish a legal 
relationship between the individual contract and a spontaneous and extra-contractual 
private ordering [emphasis in original].”14 This has nothing to do however, as 
Teubner is quick to disclaim – with a Hayekian conception of spontaneous 
order, whereby a discovery process gives rise to a competitive order. “Neither 
the market nor competition has a role to play. Instead, networking and co-
operation are the purveyors of a spontaneous order. Generalized reciprocity is 
the fundamental motor of spontaneous order within the network.”15 
 
Networks are thus constituted by internal conflicts that derive from the 
simultaneous challenges posed by external contradictions. These, in turn, take 
different structural forms: contradictions between bilateral exchange and 
multilateral connectivity, contradictions between competition and co-operation 
and contradictions between collective and individual orientation. What is not 
immediately apparent from this analysis is that it is a highly normative project. 
This only becomes evident in the last three chapters of the book, in which 
Teubner persuades us that if these contradictions are successfully internalized 
                                            
11 Ibid.,158.  
12 Ibid.,162. 
13 Ibid., 163.  
14 Ibid., 164.  
15 Ibid., 164-165.  
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by the network – thereby also endangering internal network co-ordination, as 
well as trustworthiness and responsibility displayed by the network - a need for 
regulation arises.  
Teubner’s law of networks 
 
How should networks be regulated? Consider Teubner’s example of the legal 
response that should be given to the first structural contradiction that occurs in 
networks – that between bilateral exchange contracts and multilateral 
connectivity. Internal decision making in networks is simultaneously 
subordinated to the contradictory demands of bilateral exchange and 
multilateral connectivity. In his analysis Teubner invokes a case, in which a 
retailer of optical goods distributes some of its products through its fully own 
subsidiaries and some of them through franchise outlets. The firm bundles the 
purchasing of both channels in order to gain higher discounts from suppliers. 
Suppliers guarantee – without any differentiation – discounts to the firm of up 
to 52%. The firm however supplies its franchisees with an ‘official’ production 
discount list. The list only details production discount of up to 38%. Should 
there be an obligation on the firm to pass on its advantages also the 
franchisees? Teubner response is, yes. He conceptualizes several duties of 
loyalty that, in his opinion, arise in the virtue of the connectivity of those 
contracts as described above. This is justified by the “network purpose” of 
these contracts, that is, in virtue of the function that these contracts perform.  
 
But the notion of ‘network purpose’ entails more than that. As he notes, the 
network purpose – as distinct from the contractual exchange purpose and the 
common purpose in corporate law – is not only relevant for duties of loyalty, 
but also plays its part in the judicial review of standard form contracts 
applicable to networks. For example, if in the above case, all risk would be 
transferred from the firm to the franchisees, this – in Teubner’s view – would 
not be justified by the network purpose. “Exactly the opposite: the real aim of 
networking is the establishment of an unusually close degree of co-operation 
between suppliers and manufacturers in the transition from a typical business 
operation through exchange contract to just-in-time systems.”16 He makes it 
explicit however that “the issue is not one of the precedence of supplier 
interests.” Rather, “the legal policy is to secure demanding technological 
coordination between different stages in the market through legal protection of 
                                            
16 Ibid.,. 200.  
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autonomy and legal support for co-operation within complex contractual 
relations.”17 
Networks and the limits of comparative sociological jurisprudence 
 
In the past there have been complaints, including those articulated by Teubner 
himself, concerning poor reception of systems theory in the English speaking 
world. One American law professor famously commented on Luhman’s The 
Unity of the Legal System by saying that it reminds him of Jabberwocky – the 
famous nonsense verse poem written by Lewis Caroll (you know: “Twas bryllyg, 
and ye slythy toves” etc.). Bad translations played a role – Teubner 
acknowledged on one occasion. And national and cultural context play a role 
too. “However, the core of the problem lies elsewhere. It is a question of 
whether the language is complex enough to match the complexity of the subject 
matter.”18 In his book he argues that the notion of connected contracts, if 
manipulated skillfully, will suffice to account for many properties of networks. 
But, of course, the notion of ‘connected contracts’ is one that can be found in 
the BGB. Common law, for example, has no equivalent notion. Thus, it is 
perhaps no coincidence that Hugh Collins starts his preface to the book with a 
question that can easily appeal to the common law audience – “Does the 
common law need a new legal concept”?  
 
Hugh Collins is a professor at London School of Economics and a close 
acquaintance of Teubner. One of the few legal scholars in the common law 
world who use systems theory (he did that rather well in his book Regulating 
contracts). It is thus, no coincidence that he wrote the Introduction to Networks, 
especially given that both Collins and Teubner are the editors of Hart’s 
International Studies in the Theory of Private Law series. Collins’ Introduction, 
excellent even if unusually long, is an essay in its own right worth of a review. 
In that essay professor Collins tests the feasibility of applying Teubner’s notion 
of ‘connected contracts’ in the English common law. His essay is meant as an 
introduction to Teubner’s book, but one may want as well read it as an 
afterword to it and it may turn out to be even more valuable then.  
 
One central premise of Collins’ argument will be relevant here. “A difference in 
legal methods creates a[n] . . . obstacle of a shared multi-jurisdictional concept 
                                            
17 Ibid., 201.  
18 Gunther Teubner, “How Law Thinks: Toward a Constructivist Epistemology of Law” (1989) 
23 (5) Law and Society Review 728. 
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of network”19 – he observes. It is hardly surprising that Teubner ties his analysis 
to a concept that can be found in the BGB. It can be envisaged that other 
continental scholars could do the same thing. But “the common law lacks the 
disciplines of the need to find a root in a particular text, and the statutory texts 
themselves are not perceived generally as a source of principle that can be 
developed.”20 Moreover, differences in substantive law can also provide to be an 
obstacle. “For instance, whereas a German legal scholar can manipulate such 
doctrines as good faith in contracts etc., these handy tools are not readily 
available to the common lawyer.”21  
 
A legal concept of a network suitable for a variety of legal systems may thus be 
difficult to find. As professor Collins soberly notes: “a sophisticated doctrinal 
mode that might seem plausible for networks in one legal systems may make 
little sense within the doctrinal framework of another.”22 The notion of 
‘connected contracts’ is a case in point. At the same time, this is not to say that 
a comparison may not be fruitful, but it is just to say that it has limits. “What 
the German doctrinal debates may teach common lawyers . . . is that extending 
traditional solutions to the problems posed by networks will probably not work 
satisfactorily in the end.”23 
 
The limits of comparative sociological jurisprudence are thus, the same as those 
of the comparative law method. Comparative law can provide us with important 
insights into how different legal systems operate. In the same vein comparative 
sociological jurisprudence can tell us, also in a prescriptive way, how the 
features of these networks differ in different legal contexts. But what about 
transnational networks? Comparative sociological jurisprudence hardly 
provides a framework for the analysis of transnational legal phenomena. Just as 
comparative law is not international law, comparative sociological 
jurisprudence is not the law of transnational private regulation. And yet there 
can be little doubt that, at the transnational level, many networks perform 
important regulatory functions. This is evident for example when these 
networks internalize certain environmental, health and safety, labor or human 
rights standards. If Collins is right saying that we have to take Teubner’s 
analysis with a grain of comparative salt, what about the utility of that analysis 
for transnational networks, such as global value chains? Networks as Connected 
                                            
19 Teubner (n 1) 26. 
20 Ibid.  
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid., 27. 
23 Ibid., 72. 
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Contracts provides fruitful ground to think about this and other questions, but 
the answers to them – whether drawing on or distinguishing themselves from 
Teuber’s analysis – are only to arrive in the future.  
Conclusion 
  
Professor Teubner’s analysis is rich and impressive. Network legal scholarship 
is only emerging, and Teubner’s book in an important contribution to that 
strand of literature. Legal networks’ scholars will most certainly read his 
recently published volume widely. But many of them will question his method. 
They will do that because Teuber’s method is problematic, to say the least. 
Collins points out to the limits of comparative sociological jurisprudence, but 
sociological jurisprudence is problematic in its own right, in particular because 
it offers little analytical clarity. It claims to use insights from economics, 
sociology, political science etc. but it does it in a rather obscure way. Moreover, 
Teubner’s relaince on systems theory largely removes the question of power 
from the analysis. In other words, Teuber’s method may not be the only way of 
thinking about networks; it may, perhaps, not even be the most useful one.  
